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A recurring problem in litigation involves the attempted intro-
duction into evidence of a statement made by an agent of one of the
parties. The controversy centers around whether the agent's state-
ment can be used in evidence against his employer. The problem
commonly arises in tort litigation, but is certainly not limited to
that area. The evidential question is present regardless of whether
the agent who made the statement is joined as a party to thelawsuit.
The problems associated with an agent's admission are many
and varied. At least two distinctly different approaches have been
taken by the courts in deciding the admissibility of the agent's
statement against his principal.' Collateral problems also arise. For
example, can the existence and scope of the agency relationship
itself be proved by the agent's out-of-court declarations? 2 What if
an agent's admission is contained in a report to his principal or in
his utterances to his fellow agents?' Is an agent's admission that is
made in a sworn deposition admissible against his principal?4 There
has been no judicial unanimity in answering these and other ques-
tions involving admissions by an agent. This comment will discuss
these and other problems connected with the admissibility of an
agent's admissions against his principal.
1-. ADMISSIONS: OPERATION AND THEORIES OF ADMISSm ITY
To clearly understand the rationale of "vicarious" admissions
by agents, it is first necessary to comprehend the theory of admis-
sions in general. Dean Wigmore defines an admission as a party's
prior out-of-court statement offered by an opponent to prove the
truth of what it says which is inconsistent with the declarant's posi-
tion at trial.- Such a statement falls within the classic definition of
hearsay.' Even though courts may differ on the exact theory used
1. See pt. I, §§ B and C of this comment.
2. See pt. V of this comment.
3. See pt. IV of this comment.
4. See pt. VI, §§ A and B of this comment.
5. See 4 J. WIGMOREE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chad. rev. 1972). Note that the statement will
never be introduced against the party unless it is inconsistent with his claim at trial. Thus,
this portion of Professor Wigmore's definition is essentially self-enforcing.
6. See, e.g., UNiORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (195 ); C. McCoRAICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmcK].
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to receive an admission,7 it is universally accepted that a party's
admissions may be introduced into evidence by his opponent.8 This
is true even though the party spoke without personal knowledge of
the truth of his assertion.' When received by the court the admission
is substantive evidence of the proposition stated and is not merely
limited to use as impeachment evidence.'" Furthermore, no founda-
tion testimony is required prior to receipt of an admission.'
Two basic theories of admissibility have been advanced. The
traditional view, espoused by Professor Morgan,'2 is that admissions
are introduced as an exception to the hearsay rule. Most exceptions
to the hearsay rule are based on the exceptional degree of reliability
inherent in the declaration,'3 plus, perhaps, a need for the state-
ment's admission into evidence because of the declarant's death or
absence." Admissions clearly do not fit into this pattern since the
party need not have first-hand knowledge of the truth of his declara-
tion,'15 and the statement may even have been self-serving at the
time it was made.'6 Thus, it is not essential to the admissibility of
a party's prior admissions that it must have been made under cir-
7. Numerous attempts have been made to formulate a satisfactory rationale for receiv-
ing admissions. See, e.g., Fisch, Extra Judicial Admissions, 4 SYRAcusE L. REV. 90 (1952);
Harper, Admissions of Party-Opponents, 8 MERcER L. REv. 252 (1957); MORGAN, Admissions,
12 WASH. L. REv. 181 (1937); Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to The Hearsay Rule, 30
YAu, L. J. 355 (1921); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85
U. PA. L. REv. 484 (1937).
8. See MCCORMiCK § 262.
9. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1955); Smedra v. Sta-
nek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951); Mathews v. Carpenter, 231 Miss. 677, 97 So.2d 522 (1957);
Gaddy v. State Bd. of Registration For Healing Arts, 397 S.W.2d 347, 354 (Spr. Mo. App.
1965); Berkowitz v. Simone, 96 R.I. 11, 188 A.2d 665 (1963); Washington-Vir. R.R. v. Deahl,
126 Va. 141, 144-45, 100 S.E. 840, 841 (1919). For additional cases on the subject, see Annot.,
54 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1957).
10. Gonzales v. Landon, 215 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 350
U.S. 920 (1955); Harrison v. United States, 42 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1930); Olson v. Hodges,
236 Iowa 612,19 N.W.2d 676 (1945); Scherffius v. Orr, 442 S.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Spr. Mo. App.
1969).
Note that a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is limited to use as impeachment
evidence. See Koenigsdorf, Prior Inconsistent Statements As Substantive Evidence-Missouri
Retains the Orthodox Rule, 39 Mo. L. REv. 472 (1974). Admissions are clearly not so limited.
11. See, e.g., Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1957); Schaible v.
Uhl, 343 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1961); Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S.W.2d 127 (1933);
Southern Bank of Fulton v. Nichols, 202 Mo. 309, 100 S.W. 613 (1907); Howe v. Messimer,
84 Mont. 304, 275 P. 281 (1929); McCoIiCK § 262 at 630.
12. See E. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVmENCE 265 (1962).
13. McCoRMicK, § 253.
14. See Shklar, Evidence-The Unavailability Requirement For Declarations Against
Interest-Should It Be Retained?, 39 Mo. L. REV. 461 (1974).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text infra.
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cumstances that guarantee its trustworthiness. Professor Morgan
himself admits,
The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests
not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it wasde
furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adver-
sary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no
opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of
credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath."
The very basis of the hearsay objection is thus said to disappear; the
opportunity for cross-examination is said to be satisfied.,8 It would
seem, however, that this argument is not nearly so compelling when
the admission is made by an agent of the party. Since the principal
is not the author of the admission, his credibility has not been
brought into issue.
- A second theory of admissibility is premised on the assumption
that the statement is simply not hearsay. Under this theory admis-
sions are received in evidence because they are said to be a product
of the adversary system. The trier of fact is entitled to hear a party's
prior contradiction of his present assertion.'9 Admissions are admis-
sible under this theory because a party has taken inconsistent posi-
tions which must be explained to and weighed by the jury. It is to
say that in litigation, a party should be bound by what he says, at
least to the extent that the jury should be allowed to consider what
he said for whatever it may be worth. Recognizing that admissions
are not allowed into evidence because of any particular characteris-
tics of trustworthiness, the new Federal Rules of Evidence adopt
this nonhearsay position." Although either rationale will support
the direct admission of a party, only the second theory supports
admissibility of the out-of-court statement made by the agent of a
party.
Missouri decisions have long referred to admissions as "admis-
sions against interest."2' Such phraseology is unfortunate because it
17. Morgan, supra note 12 at 266.
18. See 4 WIGMOR, supra note 5, at § 1048.
19. See McCoRmiCK, § 262 at 629; Morgan, supra note 12 at 265. Harvey, Evidence Code
Section 1224-Are An Employee's Admissions Admissible Against His Employer?, 8 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 59, 62 (1967); Hetland, Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?,
46 IowA L. REv. 307, 308 (1961); Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions- An Estoppel, 26 U.
CiNN. L. Rxv. 17, 29-30 (1957); Strahorn, supra note 7. See also Cox v. Esso Shipping Co.,
247 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1957).
20. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2).
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Baker, 505 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1974); Cline
v. Carthage Crushed Limestone Co., 504 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1973).
1975]
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invites confusion between admissions and declarations against in-
terest, a totally separate and distinct exception to the hearsay rule.22
To be admissible a declaration against interest must have been
contrary to the declarant's interest at the time the statement was
made." Although the vast majority of admissions are indeed against
the party's interest when they are made, no such requirement is
applied to admissions.24 To illustrate this point, Professor McCor-
mick hypothesizes a party who purchased a tract of land or a note
which has since become the subject of a lawsuit. Prior to his pur-
chase the party stated that the deed or note was a forgery. Although
not against the party's interest when made, the statement is receiv-
able in evidence as an admission.2s Perhaps one of the clearest judi-
cial expressions on the subject is found in State v. Anderson:25
But the admissibility of a party's own previous statements or dec-
larations in respect to the subject in controversy, as evidence
against him, does not in any manner depend upon the question
whether they were for or against his interest at the time they were
made, or afterwards.
Hence, the misnomer of "admissions against interest" is an invita-
tion to confuse admissions with declarations against interest and
"to engraft upon admissions a requirement without basis in reason
or authority." 7
It is important to distinguish between evidential admissions,
which are the subject of this comment, and judicial admissions.
Evidential admissions are words or conduct of a party or his repre-
sentative offered in evidence against that party. Judicial admissions
are not evidence at all. Rather, they take the form of stipulations
between the parties, formal admissions in the pleadings, or affirma-
22. See generally McCoRMICK §§ 276-80; Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against
Interest, 5 VAND. L. Ry. 451 (1952).
23. See McComb v. Vaughn, 358 Mo. 951, 218 S.W.2d 548 (1949); Straughan v. Asher,
372 S.W.2d 489, 494-95 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Neely v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241
Mo. App. 1244, 252 S.W.2d 88 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952).
24. See, e.g., Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932); Barber v. Seabord
Coast Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 1232, 1238 (S.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd mem., 488 F.2d 1056 (5th
Cir. 1974); Wade v. Lane, 189 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1960); Conway v. Hudspeth, 229 Ark.
735, 738-39, 318 S.W.2d 137, 140 (1958); East Kentucky Rural Elec. Coop. v. Phelps, 275
S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1955); Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 380 (Ky.
App. 1970); Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wash. App. 519, 523, 475 P.2d 908, 911 (1970); Lev,
supra note 19, at 29.
25. McCoRPmK, § 262 at 630.
26. 10 Ore. 448, 454 (1882).
27. McCoRMICK, § 262 at 631.
[Vol. 40
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tive responses to requests for admissions. Judicial admissions elimi-
nate any controversy concerning the fact admitted.28 Hence, there
is no need for any proof at the trial of a fact which has been the
subject of a judicial admission." An evidential admission, on the
other hand, is not conclusive, and the party who made the admis-
sion may always explain the prior statement and introduce contrary
testimony. 0
I. ADMISSIONS oF AGENTS: RULES GOVERNING ADMISSIBILITY
A. Introduction
When a party to a lawsuit has expressly authorized another
person to speak on his behalf, it is a firmly accepted extension of
the admission rule that the agent's declarations be admitted against
the party.' For example in Porter v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society,3 2 the plaintiff brought suit on a group disability policy. In
response to a letter from plaintiff's attorney prior to commencement
of the suit, the insurance company instructed plaintiff that all mat-
ters pertaining to her claim would be handled directly through the
office of her employer. As a result, statements made by her em-
ployer's office manager, who supervised the group insurance policy,
were held to be properly received against the insurer.3
In Nuttall v. Holman,31 plaintiff sued for specific performance
of a contract for the sale of land, alleging that defendant had sold
the land to others in violation of their agreement. At the trial, the
secretary of the bank officer making arrangements for the loan testi-
fied that plaintiff had come to her office, told her that he was unable
to raise his share of the money, and gave her instructions to transmit
the information to the bank officer and the defendant. In ruling the
28. Id. at 630.
29. Polk v. Missouri- K.-T. Ry., 341 Mo. 1213, 111 S.W.2d 138 (1937).
30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Brown, 126F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1942); Aide v. Taylor, 214 Minn.
212, 7 N.W.2d 757 (1943); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1048 at 5.
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1958) provides:
In an action between the principal and a third person, statements of an agent to a
third person are admissible in evidence against the principal to prove the truth of
facts asserted in them as though made by the principal, if the agent was authorized
to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, any
statements concerning the subject matter.
Similarly, FED. R. Evm. 801, ADvisoRy CoAm. NOTE (d)(2)(C) states:
No authority is required for the general proposition that a statement authorized by
a party to be made should have the status of an admission by the party.
32. 71 S.W.2d 766 (K.C. Mo. App. 1934).
33. Id. at 777.
34. 110 Utah 375, 173 P.2d 1015 (1946).
1975]
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secretary's testimony properly admitted, the Utah court said that
plaintiff, in effect, had made the secretary his agent for conveying
the particular information which he contended was hearsay.35
Hence, where express authority to speak may be found, state-
ments made by the agent will be admitted against his principal.
While such a rule is easily stated, "express authority to make ad-
missions will rarely be found in the contract of employment" 36 since
"few principals employ agents for the purpose of making damaging
statements."3 Because a rule which admits only expressly author-
ized statements would likely result in almost total exclusion of
agent's statements, courts will sometimes find that an agent's dec-
laration was impliedly authorized.38
A common example of implied authority is in the area of tele-
phone conversations. Statements made by a person answering a
telephone call made to a place of business in ordinary course of
business are admissible, although there is no.personal identification
of the person answering the call. Courts imply authority in the
person answering to transact such business for the company.39
In the vast majority of cases an agent has authority to perform
certain functions for the principal; but is without authority to speak
on the principal's behalf. Where express authority is not present,
jurisdictions employ different approaches in finding implied author-
ity or some similar basis for admitting the agent's declarations. The
remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the
various approaches taken.
B. Admission of Statements Concerning a Matter Within the
Scope of Employment
When the agent makes a statement out subject matter which
is within the scope of his employment, a growing number of jurisdic-
tions admit the statement into evidence as an admission of his
principal. This view, which does not require "speakins authority"
on the part of the agent,4" must be distinguished from the contrary
position which requires that the agent be authorized to actually
speak for the principal. All that is necessary, under this newer ap-
35. 173 P.2d at 1018.
36. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 66 (10th Cir. 1958).
37. FED. R. Evm. 801, ADvisoRy COMM. NoTE (d)(2)(D).
38. See, e.g., Cafone v. Spiniello Constr. Co., 42 N.J. Super. 590, 127 A.2d 441 (App.
Div. 1956).
39. See, e.g., Mattan v. Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166 S.W.2d 557 (1942); Shelton v.
Wolf Cheese Co., 338 Mo. 1129, 93 S.W.2d 947 (1936); Barrickman v. National Utilities Co.,
191 S.W.2d 265 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945).
40. See part 19, § C of this comment.
[Vol. 40
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proach is that the admission by the agent concern a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment.
The application of the rule can bestbe illustrated by recent
cases which have chosen to adopt it. In Myrick v. Lloyd,4' the defen-
dant's son was operating a vehicle while working for his father's
business. In the course of the journey the vehicle struck plaintiffs
child. While driving the child to the hospital, the driver told the
child's parents that the accident was his fault and that their child
was not to blame. In adopting what it called the "more practical and
liberal rule, 42 the Florida Supreme Court held that the driver's
statement was admissible against his employer because it concerned
a matter within the scope of the driver's agency. That is,the driver
was employed to operate the vehicle and his statement concerned
the manner in which it was operated.
One of the best known cases supporting this view is KLM v.
Tuller.43 The case involved a crash of a KLM airliner; the plane's
radio operator failed to send a distress signal to the control tower.
Several hours later the radio operator told the Inspector of Acci-
dents:
We were tuned at ... the tower frequency, and I honestly must
say that I did not think when it happened, to take the microphone
and tell people there was something wrong with the plane. I could
tell you that would never happen. You first think of your skin, and
then of the microphone."
In sustaining the district court's ruling that the statement was ad-
missible against KLM, the court of appeals reasoned that the state-
ment concerned a matter within the scope of the radio operator's
employment, since his compliance with undisputed safety regula-
tions was in question. 5
In Nobero Co. v. Ferro Trucking Co.,4 a landlord sued his ten-
ant for damage to the leased premises which resulted from a fire
allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. A fire department offi-
cer testified that one of defendant's employees told him that he and
another employee had been cleaning away paint with gasoline when
the gas ignited. Since the statement related to matters within the
41. 158 Fla. 47, 27 So.2d 615 (1946).
42. Id. at 49, 27 So.2d at 616.
43. 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
44. 292 F.2d at 783 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 783.
46. 107 N.J. Super. 394, 258 A.2d 713 (App. Div. 1969).
1975]
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duties of the agent, the court deemed it property admitted.4 7
The newly enacted Federal Rules of Evidence adopt the posi-
tion that admissions of agents should be allowed in evidence against
the principal when they concern "a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment made during the existence of the relation-
ship." In recommending this position, the advisory committed
noted:
The tradition has been to test the admissibility of statements by
agents, as admissions, by applying the usual test of agency. Was
the admission made by the agent acting in the scope of his employ-
ment? Since few principals employ agents for therpose of making
damaging statements, the usual result was exclusion of the state-
ment. Dissatisfaction with this loss of valuable and helpful evi-
dence has been increasing. A substantial trend favors admitting
statements related to a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment.49
This test of admissibility was also adopted by both the Model Code
of Evidence" and the Uniform Rules of Evidence.5'
Criticism of this rule of admissibility is generally premised on
the supposed lack of trustworthiness inherent in the agent's prior
out-of-court declaration. 2 It is submitted that such criticism is
largely unfounded. Since the statement concerns an act within the
authority of the agent, it can rarely be claimed that he is unfamiliar
with what occurred. In light of the apparent unity of interest be-
tween principal and agent in seeing that the authorized act is per-
formed, exclusion of the agent's statement would seem illogical.
Admittedly, exclusion under the hearsay rule may seem theoreti-
cally sound if we look only to the physical absence of the principal
at the time the statement was made, yet the broad scope of the
47. Many other cases support the view discussed in this section. See, e.g., Ryerson v.
Crane, 417 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1969); Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958); Martin
v. Savage Truck Line, 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954); Thorton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 257
P.2d 238 (1953); Litman v. Pepper, 214 Minn. 127, 7 N.W.2d 334 (1943); Whitaker v. Keough,
144 Neb. 790, 14 N.W.2d 596 (1944); Branch v. Dempsey, 266 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965)
(Sharp, J., dissenting); Marshall v. Thomason, 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962) (Lewis,
J., dissenting).
48. FED. R. Evm. 801 (d)(2)(D).
49. FED. R. Evw. 801, ADVISORY COMM. NOr (d)(2)(D). See also Grayson v. Williams,
256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
50. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(a) (1942).
51. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVmENCE 63 (9)(a).
52. See, e.g., Falknor, Vicarious Admissions And The Uniform Rules, 14 VAND. L. REv.
855 (1961); Note, Admissibility of An Agent's Declaration Against His Employer Under
Evidence Code Section 1224, 19 HAST. L.J. 1395 (1968).
[Vol. 40
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/12
ADMISSIONS OF AGENTS
agency relationship itself lends support to admitting the statement.
Since the law deems the principal constructively present for the
agent's authorized acts, the same theory should be applied to the
agent's statements concerning those acts.5
Both the new Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence propose an additional safeguard: An agent's statement
is not admissible unless made "during the existence of the relation-
ship."54 The statement must be made while the agent is still an
employee of the principal. If it is made after the relationship has
been severed, the statement is not admissible into evidence against
the principal. Obviously, the purpose of such a provision is to guard
against vengeful and vindicative assertions of an ex-employee. Such
a rule adds to the statement's reliability and should be required by
courts adopting this standard of admissibility.
It is important to recognize that this rule will not result in the
universal admissibility of agents' statements. An employee's decla-
ration about matters not falling within his own scope of authority
should not be admissible against his employer. The Idaho court
recognized this principal in Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc.," where
plaintiff testified that after his fall in defendant's store he overheard
one of the grocery checkers say that the floor had too much wax on
it.-" In holding that the testimony was improperly admitted, the
court reasoned that a grocery checker's authority did not extend "in
any manner to the condition of the floor."5
C. The Missouri Approach: Requirement That Agent Have
"Speaking Authority"
In order to get an agent's statement admitted into evidence
against his principal, present Missouri law requires that the court
be satisfied that the agent was either expressly or impliedly author-
ized by his principal to speak on the subject. The Missouri approach
is diametrically opposite the position of the new federal rule; Mis-
souri's "authority" requirement looks the authority to make the
declaration itself, whereas the federal rule requires only that the
subject matter of the declaration be something within the agent's
authority.
Early Missouri decisions were prone to test admissibility of an
53. See Comment, Vicarious Admissions and Utterances, 47 MARQ. L. Rav. 84, 88-89
(1963).
54. FiD. R. Evm. 801 (d)(2)(D), UmuORm RuLE OF EvDENCE 63 (9).
55. 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1-194 (1974).
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agent's statement under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
Res gestae, unfortunately, means different things to different peo-
ple. The term was actually used to refer to several different excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. " Usually, however, res gestae as used in
the older Missouri cases can be equated with the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule. In Sconce v. Jones" the court said
that to be admissible under res gestae, the statement must not be
a "mere reflective narration of past events"60 and the "true test is
neither the time nor the place of a statement but whether it is a
spontaneous statement produced by the event itself."6'
The leading early Missouri case setting forth this position is
Shelton v. Wolf Cheese Co." In Shelton, an employee of the defen-
dant corporation had allegedly been involved in a motor vehicle
accident during the course of his employment. Plaintiff sought to
introduce evidence of a telephone conversation with the defendant's
manager in which the manager admitted that the employee worked
for the cheese company and that "he was out calling on some cus-
tomers" at the time of the accident. At trial the manager denied
ever having such a conversation. In holding the alleged phone con-
versation inadmissible, the court, in classic language, stated:
, , * declarations or admissions of an agent with respect to an act
or transaction, made after the occurence of the act or the comple-
tion of the transaction, are not provable against the principal. This
rule is the basis for the exclusion of evidence of declarations of an
agent that he had previously bound his principal by a contract, as
well as for the exclusion of evidence of the admissions of a servant,
whose alleged negligence caused injury to another, made long after
the accident. Such statements are merely hearsay and like those
of any other person, and cannot affect his principal. A rule that
would allow an agent, after a transaction is closed, to admit away
the rights of his principal, would be too dangerous to be tolerated. 3
Unless an agent's declaration fell within the ambit of Shelton,
Missouri courts refused to admit it against the principal. Missouri
cases did not recognize a theory of admissibility separate from res
58. See Showalter v. Western Pac. R.R., 16 Cal.2d 460, 465, 106 P.2d 895, 898 (1940);
Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 410 (1897); Harvey, supra, note 19, at 68; Comment, Res Gestae: A
Synonym For Confusion, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 229 (1968). See also MCCORMICK 1 § 244, at 517
(1954), where res gestae is referred to as a "rather clumsy theory."
59. 343 Mo. 362, 121 S.W.2d 777 (1938).
60. Id. at 370, 121 S.W.2d at 781.
61. Id. at 371, 121 S.W.2d at 782.
62. 338 Mo. 1129, 93 S.W.2d 947 (1936).
63. Id. at 1138, 93 S.W.2d at 952.
[Vol. 40
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gestae. It is probable that res gestae was relied upon by the courts
because the statement in question was usually made at or near the
event and thus was either considered a part of the event itself and
therefore non-hearsay, -or was an excited utterance. Actually, these
constitute totally separate and distinct rationales for admissibility,
as the Missouri courts now recognize. 4 Today, an agent's admission
will not be refused by a court simply because it does not fit within
the rather abstract concept of res gestae.5 Hence, counsel should
always evaluate the admissibility of an agent's declaration from an
"admissions of agent's" standpoint as well as the statement's poten-
tial evidential value as an excited utterance." In Roush v. Alkire
Truck Lines,67 the court properly differentiated between the sepa-
rate theories of "admission by an agent" and the spontaneous decla-
ration exception to the hearsay rule. In so doing, however, the court
opted for a very strict standard in testing the admissibility of an
agent's admission. Roush involved a conversation at the scene of the
accident between plaintiff's wife and defendant's truck driver. The
trial court allowed plaintiffs wife to relate portions of the conversa-
tion in which defendant's employee made certain damaging admis-
sions. The supreme court reversed, stating:
There is nothing in this case to show the authority of the truck
driver to make the statements attributed to him, and the fact that
he was admittedly driving the truck as the defendant's agent, to-
gether with the other circumstances revealed by the evidence, do
not indicate that the scope of authority of the driver could include
by any reasonable interpretation the making of admissions of neg-
ligence binding on his employer. 68
In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Baker,69 plaintiff
sought to condemn defendant's property. At trial, defendant was
allowed to testify that plaintiffs resident engineer had previously
told her that the land in question was worth $24,000. In reversing,
the court ruled that the trial court "patently erred in overruling the
64. For a correct analysis of the two separate theories of admissibility see Roush v.
Alkire Truck Lines, 299 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1957)- Some recent cases evidently still do not draw
the distinction. See Alabama Power Co. v. Sellers, 283 Ala. 137, 214 So.2d 833 (1968); Craw-
ford v. County of Sacramento, 239 Cal. App.2d 791, 49 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1966); Gorman v.
McCleaf, 369 Mich. 237, 119 N.W.2d 636 (1963).
65. Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, 299 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. 1957).
66. Of course, all other exceptions to the hearsay rule should also be considered.
67. 299 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1957).
68. Id. at 521.
69. 505 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1974).
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timely objections of the Commission's counsel,"70 since defendant
had not shown that the Commission's resident engineer had author-
ity to speak for the Highway Commission.
It should be made clear that not even the present Missouri
position always results in the exclusion of the agent's statement
against the principal. Several cases have admitted an agent's state-
ment against his employer when the requirement of "speaking au-
thority" was held to have been satisfied. In Cline v. Carthage
Crushed Limestone Co.,71 plaintiff sued for injuries sustained in a
job-related accident. At trial defendant contended plaintiff was not
entitled to maintain a common law action for damages since the
injury was covered by workmen's compensation. Three or four weeks
after the accident, Potter, defendant's "chief executive officer,"
came to plaintiff's home to talk with him concerning the accident.
Over objection, plaintiff's wife was allowed to testify that Potter
said, "I consider this a liability case and the insurance company
considers it a compensation case. 72 The supreme court affirmed,
ruling that in visiting plaintiff to discuss the accident, Potter's
statement was "attributable to the corporation he was represent-
ing. '"" Similarly in Kaufman v. Baden Ice Cream Mfrs." the presi-
dent of the defendant corporation went to plaintiff's home to discuss
a traffic accident involving plaintiff and one of defendant's drivers.
The president admitted to plaintiff that the employee was on his
way to make a delivery when the accident occurred. The court held
the evidence properly admitted, since, in discussing the case with
plaintiff and his family, the president "was acting within the scope
of his duties as president of the company."h
As would be expected, "speaking authority" is more readily
implied by courts when the declarant is a high-level official of the
company; the statement of a president is more likely to be admitted
than that of a truck driver. In Garvis v. K Mart Discount Store,76
however, plaintiff was allowed to testify concerning what she had
70. Id. at 437. For additional authority supporting the Missouri position, see, e.g.,
Rekart v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.M. 491, 468 P.2d 892 (N.M. App. 1970); Big Mack
Trucking Co., Inc. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973); Falknor, supra note 51.
71. 504 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1973).
72. Id. at 114.
73. Id.
74. 7 S.W.2d 298 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928). The "accident investigation" cases have been
distinguished as being in a separate category, and thus not altering the general Missouri rule.
See Rosser v. Standard Milling Co., 312 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. 1958).
75. 7 S.W.2d at 300.
76. 461 S.W.2d 317 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970). Garvis was an action for false imprisonment
brought by a customer.
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been told by the store's security guard when he stopped her. The
appellate court affirmed because it was thought that, in speaking
to the plaintiff incident to stopping her, the security guard had
acted within the scope of his authority. Garvis demonstrates that
an admission of a low-level agent will not be automatically ex-
cluded.
It is noteworthy that one recent Missouri decision has spoken
favorably of the federal approach. The supreme court in German v.
Kansas City,7" quotes the federal advisory committee's comment to
the effect that the traditional approach frequently results in the
"loss of valuable and helpful evidence." ' It is to be hoped that this
favorable language in German may be the first step in altering Mis-
souri's present position.
Like many other jurisdictions, Missouri recognizes that an
agent's statement which indicates knowledge of a condition or con-
trol over property, when such issues are disputed, is properly admit-
ted. This is only logical, since corporations, for example, can only
acquire knowledge through their agents." The exception can best be
illustrated by the cases recognizing it. In Bowyer v. Te-Co. Inc.,"0
plaintiff slipped on loose steps at the rear of defendant's building.
The next day plaintiff returned to defendant's offices and spoke
with defendant's vice-president, who told plaintiff that he had
known for some time that the stone slab was loose but that the
corporation had put off fixing it. Since at the trial the defendant
contended that the steps were not on it's property and therefore not
under the dominion of the corporation, the vice president's state-
ment was held to be admissible to show both knowledge and control.
Brown v. Kroger Co.s1 was a suit to recover for injuries sustained
when a paper soda carton collapsed and plaintiff was cut by flying
glass. Over defendant's objection, plaintiff introduced the deposi-
tion of the store manager in which the manager said that he knew
that the bottoms of soda cartons became weak and unfit for use after
they had been wet. In affirming, the court observed:
Such knowledge could have been acquired by Kroger only through
its proper employee or other agent and evidence tending to show
that knowledge in the form of deposition statements by its em-
ployee whose assigned duties encompassed the necessity that he
77. 512 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. en banc 1974).
78. Id. at 146.
79. See 2 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF COPORAMONS § 745 at 1043 (1954 ed.).
80. 310 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958).
81. 344 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1961).
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acquire knowledge on that subject in order to fulfill his duties as
store manager was admissible on the question of Kroger's knowl-
edge .... s2
Brown is an example of misapplication of the "knowledge" excep-
tion. The knowledge of the declarant is only relevant if the inference
can be drawn that the knowledge existed at time of the event itself.
As Professor McCormick states:
Of course, this theory is only available where the inference sought
to be drawn is the declarant's knowledge at the very time of the
declaration. Thus if a declarant, a week after the accident stated
that he knew of the bad brakes before the accident, and this is
offered to show his previous knowledge, it is hearsay and can come
in only under some exception to the hearsay rule, such as for ad-
missions of parties and their agents."
A deposition taken many months after the event is improperly ad-
mitted to show declarant's knowledge at the time of the event in
question. Thus, knowledge is not properly proved by use of a deposi-
tion. 4
In a suit involving multiple parties on one side of the lawsuit,
evidence is not rendered totally inadmissible simply because it is
competent against only one of the co-parties. When the agent him-
self is joined as a co-defendant in the suit, for example, the agent's
admission will always come into evidence against him. It is then the
responsibility of the employer's counsel to request that the trial
judge give a proper limiting instruction; the judge is under no obli-
gation to do so on his own motion." Even if the jury is instructed
that they cannot consider the agent's admission as evidence against
the principal, the plaintiff's case has assumed a higher degree of
credibility. Once a jury has heard the agent's own admission, a
limiting instruction may be of questionable practical value. Even
82. Id. at 82. See also State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 145, 101 S.W.2d
14 (1936); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank 232 Mo. App. 1071, 115 S.W.2d 121 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938);
Annot., 141 A.L.R. 704 (1942).
83. MCCORMICK, § 249 at 592. See also Couch v. Hutcherson, 243 Ala. 47, 8 So.2d 580
(1942); Kutchera v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 54 N.D. 897, 212 N.W. 51 (1927);
Annot., 141 A.L.R. 704 (1942).
84. For another case involving the misapplication of showing knowledge by use of a
deposition, see German v. Kansas City, 512 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. en banc 1974).
85. See Elms v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 335 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1960); Grimm v.
Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1957). Chawkley v. Wabash Ry., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S.W. 20 (En
banc 1927); Pyles v. Bus Lines, 427 S.W.2d 790 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); State ex rel. Nelson
v. Hammett, 240 Mo. App. 307, 203 S.W.2d 115 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947); Lanham v. vesper-
Buick Co., 21 S.W.2d 890 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929). See also Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 966 (1969).
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though the agent himself is judgment proof for all practical pur-
poses, a wise plaintiffs counsel may wish to join him as a party to
the lawsuit.
IV. INTRA-COMPANY REPORTS AND DECLARATIONS
Tort cases frequently involve accident reports filed by an agent
to his principal. The issue arises whether a statement made by an
agent to his principal qualifies as an admission against his princi-
pal. A similar problem is presented by an agent's statement to one
of his fellow agents. The courts are about evenly divided on these
questions. 81
One line of authority holds such statements inadmissible. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency would not admit such statements
because they are "statements which the principal does not intend
to be given to the world or to be considered as his statements."8 In
State ex rel. Kroger Company v. Craig,"8 Kroger was served with an
interrogatory calling for any written reports and memoranda made
by any employee or any person on behalf of defendant. Citing
Shelton v. Wolf Cheese Co.," the court ruled that, since the reports
would be incompetent as "admissions against interest" of defendant
Kroger, they need not be turned over in response to plaintiffs inter-
rogatory. Illustrating this position as applied to communications
between agents is the case of Arizona State Highway Department
v. Bechtold,"5 where plaintiff sought to admit a letter written two
months after the accident by one state traffic engineer to another.
In the letter the author stated that plaintiffs accident was "caused
presumably by malfunctioning traffic signals.""1 In holding that the
letter was erroneously admitted, the Arizona court adopted what it
referred to as the "better rule"92 of the Restatement.
On the other hand, such reports and declarations are frequently
held admissible. The advisory committee of the Federal Rules of
86. See MCCORMICK, § 267 at 642.
87. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 287, comment (a) at 9 (1958). See also Lev,
supra note 19 at 43.
88. 329 S.W.2d 804 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
89. 338 Mo. 1129, 93 S.W.2d 947 (1936); see notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
See also Smith v. Wabash Ry., 416 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. en banc 1967) (holding a report inadmissi-
ble because it was "work product.") For other cases holding such reports inadmissible, see
Dilley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 327 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 975 (1958); Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d
546 (3d Cir. 1956).
90. 105 Ariz. 125, 460 P.2d 179 (1969).
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Evidence recommended that such statements be admitted since
''communication to an outsider has not generally been thought to
be an essential characteristic of an admission. 9 3 This position is
illustrated in Compagnie De Navigation v. Mondial United Corp.14
A surveyor made a report to his principal regarding the amount of
damage to cargo. In holding the surveyor's report admissible as an
admission of the principal, the court aptly pointed out that:
The surveyor was hired to inspect and report his conclusions and
recommendations. In reporting he was doing exactly what he was
employed to do. Since part of his acts were to be reported words,
his statement was within his authority.9 5
The logic employed by the fifth circuit here is difficult to dispute.
Frequently reports are required of agents by their principal. When
this is the case, the report is plainly made within the scope of the
agent's authority. This type of statement is likely to be true, for it
is difficult to imagine an agent who would falsely relate facts to his
principal which would subject the principal to liability. The report
would only be offered against the principal when it admits some fact
disadvantageous to the principal. There would seem to be "little
basis""0 for shaping our rules of admissibility to exclude such re-
ports."
Another method of using an agent's intercompany report
against the principal arises when the principal has "adopted" the
contents of the agent's statement. This was the case in Pekelis v.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.9 in Pekelis, the defendant
established an accident board to investigate and report on air
disasters involving its own plans. Following one such crash, the
accident board reported that the cause of the crash was altimeter
error due to lack of testing. The report was approved by the defen-
dant and later submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
International Aircraft Accident Board. Plaintiff's attempts to intro-
duce the report at trial were unsuccessful. On appeal, the second
circuit reversed, since the defendant by its actions in submitting the
report had given the report the status of an "adoptive admission."9
93. FED. R. Evm. 801, ADvISoRY Comm. NoTE (d)(2)(D).
94. 316 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1963).
95. Id. at 171, n.10.
96. MCCORMICK, § 267 at 643.
97. For other cases supporting this view, see United States v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown and Root, Inc., v. American Home Assurance Co., 353 F.2d
113 (5th Cir. 1965); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1939); Dotson
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 142 F. Supp. 509 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
98. 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
99. (Id. at 128. See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp.
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V. AGENT'S STATEMENTS AS TO FACT AND SCOPE OF AGENCY
It is universally recognized that the fact of the agency relation-
ship must be established before an admission made by an agent may
be admitted against the principal, regardless of the test of admissi-
bility thereafter chosen."' For the purpose of establishing the rela-
tionship, the agent's own hearsay statements asserting the existence
of the relationship are inadmissible. '"' Nothing, however, prevents
the alleged agent from testifying at trial concerning the fact of
agency, since at trials testimony is not offered as an admission.0 2
Where the fact of agency has been established by competent
evidence, the courts are not in agreement as to whether hearsay
statements of the agent are admissible to show the scope and extent
of the agent's authority, as distinguished from the fact of agency.
Missouri cases have consistently followed the general rule that nei-
ther the existence nor the scope of the agency relationship may be
proved by the agent's own hearsay remarks. For example, in Alt v.
Grosclose,'0 3 a trespass case, the existence of an agency was con-
ceded. The only controversy centered around whether the agent's
authority extended to making unconditional sales. The court held
the extent of that authority could not be shown by the agent's own
hearsay declarations.'04
The mere establishment of the fact of agency carries with it a
certain scope of power incident to the agent's position." 5 Where the
party seeks to establish that the agent had additional powers which
are not inherent in the normal agency relationship, a minority of
courts hold that the scope of agency can be proved by the agent's
hearsay remarks. 06 The cases that attempt to apply this rule defy
349, 352 (D. Mass. 1950); Oxley v. Linnton Plywood Assn., 205 Ore. 78, 284 P.2d 766 (1955).
100. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1078 at 176.
101. See, e.g., Brownell v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 121 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir.
1941); Rosser v. Standard Milling Co., 312 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel. Massman v.
Bland, 355 Mo. 17, 194 S.W.2d 42 (1946); 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1078, at 176;
McCoRMICK, § 267 at 642.
Note, however, that the agent's statement may be admitted under another exception to
the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Mattan v. Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166 S.W.2d 557 (1942) (state
of mind exception); MCCORMICK, § 267 at 642 n.2.
102. See, e.g., Smith v. Fine, 351 Mo. 1179, 175 S.W.2d 761 (1943); Barr v. Howe, 166
S.W.2d 244, 246 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
103. 61 Mo. App. 409 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
104. For other Missouri cases holding that the scope of the relationship may not be
proved by the agent's hearsay declarations, see Rosser v. Standard Milling Co., 312 S.W.2d
106 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel. Massman v. Bland, 355 Mo. 17, 194 S.W.2d 42 (1946).
105. See Harper, Admissibility of Declarations of Corporate Agents, 76 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1927).
106. See, e.g., Jolly v. Chatahoochee Fertilizer Co., 28 Ga. App. 194, 110 S.E. 639
(1922); Mitchell v. Sherman E. McEwen Associates, 360 ll. 278, 196 N.E.2d 186 (1935).
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reconciliation; suffice it to say that the more remote the specific
powers in issue are from those generally inferred, the less likely a
court will be to allow the alleged power to be shown by the agent's
hearsay.'17
VI. ADMISSIONS CONTAINED IN DEPOSITIONS-MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT RULE 57.07(a)
A. Missouri Case Law
The question frequently arises whether an agent's admission
which is contained in a deposition may be admitted against his
principal.'10 Missouri courts have generally answered this question
in the negative. There have been numerous Missouri decisions on
the subject, several of which are especially interesting and signifi-
cant.
In Meyer v. Dubinsky Realty Co.,' 9 plaintiff attempted to in-
troduce portions of the deposition of the president of the defendant
corporation as admissions against the corporation. In holding these
statements inadmissible, the court stated:
Of course such statements, even though they were made by Dubin-
sky, the president of the company, did not constitute admissions
against defendant's interests, since Dubinsky had not given his
deposition in evidence in the course of the performance of any
official function for the defendant."'
Capra v. Phillips Investment Company"' was an action by a
restaurant owner for fire damage allegedly caused by the negligence
of two defendant corporations. The deposition of one Phillips, chair-
man of the board of both defendants, revealed that certain combus-
tible materials were stored by the corporations in the basement of
the damaged building. At trial plaintiff attempted to introduce por-
tions of the deposition as admissions against the defendant corpora-
tions. The court rejected the contention and held the statements
inadmissible against the corporations, reasoning that Mr. Phillips'
duties as chairman of the board did not include the giving of deposi-
tions.
The Missouri Supreme Court recently faced the issue again in
Tile-Craft Products Co., Inc. v. Colonial Properties, Inc.,"2 an ac-
107. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 598, 602 (1949).
108. See part III, § C supra.
109. 133 S.W.2d 1106 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939).
110. Id. at 1110.
111. 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. en banc 1957).
112. 498 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1973).
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tion for breach of contract for payment due plaintiff for building
supplies delivered to defendant. Plaintiff took the deposition of the
defendant's president, who was the sole shareholder of defendant
corporation. The trial court refused to allow into evidence portions
of the deposition as admissions of the corporation. The supreme
court affirmed, despite plaintiff's quite logical argument that the
president "is, in fact, the corporation. '113
Thus, current Missouri case law on the subject of the use of an
agent's admission which is contained in a deposition can be accur-
ately summarized by saying that it will never be admissible."' Mis-
souri courts have consistently taken the position that no agent ever
acts within his scope of authority when he is giving a deposition."'
As the cases just discussed clearly indicate, Missouri courts hold
this rule to be applicable regardless of the deponent's position in the
organization and regardless of the authority he may possess in com-
pany affairs."'
B. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 57.07(a)
Effective January, 1975, Missouri adopted a series of new dis-
covery rules patterned largely after the federal rules of discovery.
Rule 57.07(a), which deals with the admissibility of depositions
given by certain agents, provides:
(a) Use of Depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposi-
tion, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as
though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used
against any party who was present or represented at the taking of
the deposition or who had proper notice thereof, in accordance with
any of the following provisions: ...
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time
of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent, or a person designated under Rule 57.03 (b) (4) or 57.04 (a)
to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership
113. Id. at 548..
114. Of course, testimony in a deposition which shows knowledge or control, when such
are at issue, will be admissible, German v. Kansas City, 512 S.W.2d 135, 145-46 (Mo. En Banc
1974).
115. For other Missouri cases representing this approach, see Pettus v. Casey, 358
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962); Davis v. Sedalia Yellow Cab Co., 280 S.W.2d 869 (K.C. Mo. App.
1955); Kolb v. Howard Corp., 219 S.W.2d 856 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
116. The refusal to admit admissions contained in the depositions of high-ranking
corporate officials has been criticized as illogical. See Loyal's Auto Exch. v. Munch, 153 Neb.
628, 45 N.W.2d 913 (1951).
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or association or governmental agency which is a party, may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose."17
The new rule makes an important change in current Missouri
law; it alters the rule concerning the use which can be made of the
agent's statements in a deposition at trial. Under present Missouri
case law, an agent's admission which is contained in a deposition,
regardless of his position or authority, cannot be admitted against
the principal. In effect, Missouri courts carved out a specific activ-
ity, that of giving a deposition, which was absolutely outside the
scope of any agent's authority and scope of duty. Under new rule
57.07(a), however, an admission made in a deposition by one of the
high-ranking agents specified in the rule would be admitted in evi-
dence against the employer without regard to the question of the
agent's authority."'
The adoption of 57.07 (a) (2) presents a significant problem.
The controversy centers around Article 5, section 5, of the Missouri
Constitution:
The Supreme Court may establish rules of practice and procedure
for all courts. The rules shall not change substantive rights or the
law relating to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries,
the right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The court shall
publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no
117. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.07 (1975)(emphasis added).
118. The new Missouri rule raises an interesting question as to who is a "managing
agent." Missouri's new rule is a copy of FED. R. Cxv. P. 32(a) (1971). The question of the scope
of the "managing agent" phrase has been faced many times by the federal courts. These
federal decisions take on great importance to Missouri courts in light of the decision in State
v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, (Mo. En Banc 1974), where the court said that the adoption of
legislation from another jurisdiction necessarily gives great weight to the interpretation that
the other jurisdiction's courts have given the language.
A suggested criteria for determining whether a person qualifies as a "managing agent"
under the new rule would include the following factors: (1) whether the deponent is invested
by his principal with general powers to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with
his principal's matters with respect to the subject matter of the litigation; (2) whether the
deponent is a person who could be depended upon to carry out his principal's direction to
give testimony at the demand of a party engaged in litigation with the principal; (3) what
the deponent's functions, powers, and duties (as well as his rank and title) are with reference
to the subject matter of the lawsuit; (4) whether any person or persons in higher authority
than the deponent sought to be examined are in charge of the particular matter or possessed
of the information as to which the deposition is sought; (5) whether there is any danger that
the proposed deponent's interests at the time of the deposition are adverse or hostile to the
party whose managing agent he is alleged to be. See, e.g., United States v. The Dorothy
McAllister, 24 F.R.D. 316 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Krauss v. Erie Ry. Co., 16 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
For a good analysis of the cases decided by the federal courts on the subject, see generally
Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 622 (1964).
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rule shall take effect before six months after its publication. Any
rule may be annulled or amended by a law limited to the pur-
pose.'1 9
Thus, the Missouri Constitution clearly forbids a change by
supreme court rule in the substantive evidence law. It would appear
that a change in the rules concerning the use of depositions is in fact
a change in the law of evidence. The court will undoubtedly be
called upon to decide whether rule 57.07 (a) (2) runs afoul of the
constitutional prohibition on such alteration by the supreme court.
The court could well hold that the new rule represents just such an
alteration, since an admission made in the deposition of an agent
of the requisite level would be admitted against the principal under
the new rule, whereas previous case law would have required the
exclusion of the same statement.
On the other hand, the validity of the rule be defended on the
ground that the use of a deposition does not really involve the use
of hearsay testimony. It is taken under oath with all parties repre-
sented and with opportunity for cross-examination. One might
argue that it is merely an alternate form of in-court testimony and
since the court can, by rule, provide procedural rules for the use of
various types of in-court testimony, it can adopt rules as to the use
of depositions. Certainly the direction of the rule toward broadening
the use of the agent's statement against the principal is a commend-
able development. Criticism of the rule must focus on the method
of accomplishment and not on the result.
This rule must be considered in conjunction with rule
57.03(b)(4),' 12 0 which also became effective in January, 1975. This
rule, taken verbatim from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"'
requires a corporation, partnership or other association to name one
or more of its officers, directors, managing agents, or some other
person as its agent for the purpose of giving its deposition. 22 If a
119. Mo. CONST., art. V, § 5 (1945) (emphasis added).
120. A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a
public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency
and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is
requested. In that event, the organization so named shall designate one or more
officers, director, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on
its behalf and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he
will testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make
such a designation. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or
reasonably available to the organization. This subdivision (b)(4) does not preclude
taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules.
121. FED. R. Crv. P. 30 (b)(6).
122. See note 120 supra.
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party wishing to depose a corporation describes the matters it
wishes to examine in its notice of deposition when the corporation
is a party, or in the subpoena if it is not a party, the burden is then
on the deponent to name as its agent for the purpose of giving the
deposition a person who has knowledge of the facts'in question.'2
The principal is itself subject to sanctions for failure to designate
an agent or for the agent's failure to comply with a court order.1 14
Normally an employee of a corporate party will be considered
a nonparty witness; he must be subpoenaed, simple notice being
insufficient to require him to submit to a deposition. His deposition
is not attributable to his employer. If a corporation designates one
of its employees as its agent under this rule, however, his status is
the same as an officer, director or managing agent. His deposition
"may be used by an adverse party as if it were the deposition of the
corporation itself."1 2 Because a corporation is required to select as
its agent a person who will be able to testify on the areas described
in the notice or subpoena, it would appear that under certain cir-
cumstances, a corporation must name a low-level employee as its
agent. For example, in a suit evolving from a collision between a car
and a corporation's truck, the truck driver might be the only person
connected with the company competent to represent the corporation
at the deposition; the corporation would be required to designate the
truck driver as its agent under 57.03(b)(4). This rule represents a
significant change in Missouri discovery, and, when coupled with
rule 57.07(a)(2),' 21 may also present constitutional problems.'
The portion of the rule stating that the deposition is admissible
"for any purpose" presents a further potential problem in multi-
party lawsuits. For example, consider a suit where plaintiff is suing
two legally unrelated corporations and plaintiff seeks to introduce
the deposition of an officer of one defendant against the second
defendant. Carried to its logical extreme, the "for any purpose"
clause would support the introduction of the deposition testimony
into evidence against both defendants. Such a holding would be
unfortunate since it would predicate admissibility, not on any legal
relationship between the defendants, but rather on the mere simi-
larity of the parties as co-defendants. Likewise, one defendant
should not be allowed to use the deposition of the other defendant's
123. See C. WRIGHT & A. Miura, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 2103 (1970).
124. Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 37, and Mo. R. Civ. P. 61.
125. C. WmGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvIL § 2103 (1970).
126. See pt. VI, § A this comment.
127. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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officer against such other defendant.' 8 Under the terms of the rule,
such deposition statements may be used against "adverse" parties
only, and, absent a cross-claim, co-defendants are not adverse.
It can be argued that the constitutional argument is obviated
by the portion of rule 57.07(a) which states that the deposition is
admissible "so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied
as though the witness were then present and testifying." Practically,
however, a party who has admitted a deposition of an opposing
party's officer or managing agent will hardly be able to argue for
upholding the rule on the ground that it refers back to the existing
case law rules of evidence for its admissibility. In effect, the party
would be arguing that the rule is constitutional since it contains a
provision limiting admissibility to situations where the deposition
would be admissible under prior cases. Since prior Missouri law
would exclude any admissions contained in the deposition, the
party would, in effect, be arguing against himself. It makes little
sense to argue for admissibility under the new rule while at the time
arguing in support of its constitutionality on the basis of prior cases
rendering the agent's deposition inadmissible.
A better interpretation of the clause is that it is not meant to
limit the admissions of agents. Rule 57.07(a)(2) expressly sets out
those agents whose level of authority is sufficient to render their
depositions admissible against the principal. Additionally, the re-
quirement that the deponent be an officer, director, or managing
agent "at the time of taking the deposition" adds another substan-
tial safeguard for truthfulness since, in effect, it is required that the
agent has not been dismissed by the principal.' " The rule is ob-
viously written with the intent of admitting such a deposition "for
any purpose," just as it states. A preferred interpretation of the "so
far as admissible under the rules of evidence" clause is that it gives
the trial judge power to exclude portions of the deposition which
violate some additional rule of evidence, for example, those portions
that are irrelevant' 0 or privileged.
Two other problems which may arise under the rule should also
be discussed. First of all, what effect should the "for any purpose"
128. But see Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), where, in a medical malprac-
tice suit, one co-defendant was allowed to use the deposition of another co-defendant against
him, even though no cross-claim was involved. It is submitted that such a result is incorrect.
129. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
130. See, e.g., Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974);
Zimmermann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 410 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pursche v. Atlas
Scraper and Eng. Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 371 U.S. 911 (1962); Mer-
chants MotorFreight, Inc. v. Downing, 227 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1955).
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clause have on the evidential value of the deposition testimony-.
That is, should the deposition be substantive evidence of the facts
contained therein or limited to use as impeachment evidence? The
federal courts have uniformly held that the deposition may be used
as substantive evidence.' 3' In fact, this is the most likely meaning
of the "for any purpose" language. It is unlikely that the phrase was
intended to broaden the limited use approach traditionally followed
in multi-party litigation..
The second problem concerns the admissibility of the deposi-
tion when the deponent is in court and testifying. The federal courts
have frequently considered this problem and have consistently held
that the fact that the agent has also testified is irrelevant. The
deposition is nonetheless substantively admissible.' This result is
appropriate since the rule is basically a restatement of the admis-
sions exception to the hearsay rule with respect to depositions and
the availability of the declarant has never been a factor in the ad-
missibility of an admission.
VII. CONCLUSION
Missouri, like some other jurisdictions, follows a policy of near
wholesale exclusion of an agent's admissions. The result is fre-
quently the loss of reliable and extremely probative evidence. Real-
izing this, the trend of the cases and authorities is in the direction
of more liberal admissibility. This comment advocates such an ap-
proach because it is the better reasoned rule of evidence. 3  Its ac-
ceptance by Missouri courts would be expedient.
Missouri's new deposition rule is a commendable step in the
right direction. The problem lies not with the theory of the rule, but
with the method by which the change was made. Rule 57.07 clearly
alters the position of the Missouri decisions on the admissibility of
agent's admissions contained in depositions. As such, the new rule
raises serious constitutional problems.
RICHARD L. ADAMS
131. See, e.g., Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138 (6th Cir. 1969);
Lassiter v. United States Lines, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Va. 1973).
132. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Community
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Reilley, 317 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1963); 4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTcE, § 32.04 (2d ed. 1972).
133. McCormick, Hearsay, 10 RuTroaas L. Rav. 620, 625 (1956).
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